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At the start of December, the U.S. President convened the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. The commitment involved an end to long-standing fighting in the volatile eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Shortly after, however, a sharply contrasting method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President warned, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Change of Direction

This dichotomy highlights the core tenet of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a moving away from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on economic deals and ending wars—though how this aligns with the emerging military strikes in Nigeria is an open question.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. diplomat in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative echoed this, noting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This shift is major, but analysts caution it is early to assess its effects. The approach is influenced by the President’s direct manner, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a senior fellow for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis forecasts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Strains

Differing from his recent predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later confirmed using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major disagreement has developed with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Relations and Selective Action

A similar standoff flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the stern rhetoric may have spurred the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Some analysts describe the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” she added.